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National Security: The Ultimate Threat to the
First Amendment
Erwin Knoll*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Depend upon it, Sir," Samuel Johnson observed, "when
-any man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concen-
trates his mind wonderfully."' Being subjected to a prior re-
straint on utterance and publication has much the same effect.
Fortunately, very few Americans have had the experience. As
one of those few, I can assure you that I never gave the first
amendment such close attention, or such deep devotion, as dur-
ing the six months and nineteen days when I was deprived of
its full protection by court order.2
Obviously, most of us respect the first amendment, or at
least pay lip service to it, as a cornerstone of our freedom.
Journalists, in particular, are swift to sing its praises and in-
voke its protection. I suspect, however, that few of us can ap-
preciate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and
of the press as fully as one who has been directed by a court,
on penalty of fine and imprisonment, to refrain from "publish-
ing or otherwise communicating or disclosing in any manner"
certain words, sentences, paragraphs, facts, or ideas.3
This paper discusses those aspects of United States v. Pro-
gressive, InC.4 which have a direct bearing on my thesis that
governmental claims of national security constitute the ulti-
* Editor of The Progressive.
1. 6 J. BoswELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 309 (W. Croker ed. 1846)
(1st ed. London 1791).
2. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), dis-
missed mem. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). The temporary restraining order was
issued on March 9, 1979, the preliminary injunction on March 26, 1979, and the
secret order on June 15, 1979. The case was commenced on March 8, 1979, and
was dismissed on September 23, 1979. In addition to court records, a full file is
maintained by The Progressive Foundation, 315 W. Gorham St., Madison, Wis-
consin 53703.
3. United States v. Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. March 9, 1979)
(order granting temporary restraining order).
4. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed mem. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979).
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mate threat to the first amendment. As it happens, certain as-
pects of that case directly relate to the historic case this
symposium is commemorating, for I believe it is important to
recognize that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Near v. Minnesota,5 which we quite properly celebrate as a
great victory for the first amendment, helped lay the ground-
work for potentially the most injurious assaults on freedom of
speech and of the press.
I am referring, of course, to the narrow exception stipu-
lated by Chief Justice Hughes in Near, when he observed that
in time of war, "no one would question that a government
might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops." 6 That passage was cited by the United
States Government in 1979 as a basis for restraining The Pro-
gressive,7 a monthly magazine, from publishing certain techni-
cal information concerning the manufacture of nuclear
weapons. In the words of Federal District Court Judge Robert
W. Warren:
Times have changed significantly since 1931 when Near was de-
cided. Now war by foot soldiers has been replaced in large part by war
by machines and bombs. No longer need there be any advance warn-
ing or any preparation time before a nuclear war could be commenced.
In light of these factors, this Court concludes that publication of
the technical information on the hydrogen bomb contained in [The Pro-
gressive's] article is analagous to publication of troop movements or lo-
cations in time of war and falls within the extremely narrow exception
to the rule against prior restraints.8
What Judge Warren concluded, in other words, was that the
"extremely narrow exception" in Near, which Chief Justice
Hughes explicitly had reserved for time of war, must also apply
in time of peace because of the exigencies of the nuclear age.
It must, in fact, apply at all times.
According to the Federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954,9 this
narrow exception also applies to all nuclear data. The statute
states: 'The term 'Restricted Data' means all data concerning
(1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons
(2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of
special nuclear material in the production of energy ."10
5. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
6. Id. at 716.
7. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis.), dis-
missed mem. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
8. Id. at 996.
9. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2242 (1976).
10. Id. at § 2014(y).
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Such information is "restricted" whether it originates within
the government or within the mind of a private citizen." Un-
less the information specifically has been "declassified or re-
moved from the Restricted Data category,"12 such data may not
be published.13 These are powers of censorship far more
sweeping than those embodied in the "official secrets" laws of
some nationsl4 that make no pretense of observing freedom of
the press.
In arguing its case before the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit,'5 the Government carried this
narrow exception still further, contending that the publication
of "technical information," presumably including but not con-
fined to nuclear information, is not covered by the first amend-
ment at all, but is, like obscenity,16 a form of unprotected
speech.' 7 The potential consequences of such a doctrine in our
highly technological society are mind-boggling.
I do not mean to hold the Near decision, and its narrow ex-
ception, responsible for all of these unforeseen and unfortunate
consequences. I do suggest that even the narrowest of excep-
tions have a way of attaining horrendous breadth, and that an
exception based on considerations of national security can cre-
ate truly pernicious results. My experience suggests four espe-
cially serious considerations. First, the invocation of national
security against publishing certain information makes it ex-
traordinarily difficult, and perhaps impossible, to apply first
amendment principles. Second, in attempting to impose cen-
sorship on national security grounds, the Government is able to
wield sweeping powers of selective prosecution which exert a
severe chilling effect. Third, when prior restraint is sought to
protect national security, the judicial process itself becomes a
mockery. Fourth, once prior restraint is imposed for reasons of
11. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis.),
dismissed me. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
12. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1976).
13. See id. §§ 2274, 2280.
14. See, e.g., Official Secrets Acts, 1911, 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 28, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c.
75, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 121; Atomic Energy Authority Act, 1954, 3 Eliz. 2, c. 32, § 6,
sched. 3.
15. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit never was given an opportunity to
rule on the merits. In September, 1979 the Justice Department announced that
the publication of similar material had rendered moot its attempt to block pub-
lication of The Progressive's article. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
16. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 54 (1973); Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
17. Brief for Appellee, United States v. Progressive, Inc., 610 F.2d 819 (7th
Cir. 1979).
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national security, the infringement of other freedoms is a logi-
cal and inescapable consequence.
II. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
The invocation of national security makes it extraordinarily
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to apply first amendment
principles. Chief Justice Hughes exaggerated only slightly
when he assumed in Near that "no one would question" in-
fringement of the first amendment to protect military secrets in
time of war.18 Few would have questioned such censorship a
half century ago, and I suspect even fewer would do so today.
In fact, most of us seem to have accepted the narrow exception
of Near as an unwritten addendum to the first amendment.
Even in legal and journalistic circles, the narrow exception
tends to be taken for granted. Anyone who challenges it is
likely to be dismissed as an "absolutist"--that is, as one who
naively believes the first amendment actually means what it
plainly says.19
Whenever anyone finds it necessary or expedient to weigh
freedom in the balance against any other consideration, free-
dom is likely to be found wanting. That certainly is the case
when freedom of speech and press is balanced against consid-
erations of national security. The logic is irresistible: who
would not gladly permit a trivial and temporary incursion
against the Bill of Rights when the alternative might be mili-
tary defeat or even a nuclear holocaust? That was precisely the
logic Judge Warren articulated in the Progressive case when he
stated, "you can't speak freely when you're dead."20
In the nuclear age, striking a balance between freedom and
national security becomes a task charged with emotion that ap-
proaches, and sometimes attains, hysterical proportions. Judge
Warren said, "I want to think a long, hard time before rd give a
hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin,"21 and the statement made head-
lines everywhere.22 When he later acknowledged that there
was no way The Progressive's suppressed article could "give a
18. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
19. See generally Mooney, "Right Conduct" for a "Free Press", HARPER'S,
March 1980, at 35-44.
20. United States v. Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. March 9, 1979)
(comment from the bench).
21. Id.
22. See N.Y. Times, March 10, 1979, at 1, col 2; N.Y. Times, March 11, 1979,
§ 4, at 20, col. 1; Wash. Star, March 10, 1979, at 1, col 1; Chi. Tribune, March 10,
1979, § 1, at 1, coL 2. Some reporters actually asked me whether we had any
subscribers in Uganda.
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hydrogen bomb to Idi Amin," 23 hardly anyone paid attention.
Confronted with Government allegations that national se-
curity was at stake, much of the press abandoned not only its
principles, but also its minimal standards of accuracy.24 A
headline in the Lansing State Journal blared, "You, Too, Can
Build H-Bomb,"25 and an editorial in The San Francisco Chroni-
cle described our article as "a handy guide to building your
own H-bomb."26 The Washington Post editorialized that it was
"John Mitchell's dream case-the one the Nixon administration
was never lucky enough to get: a real First Amendment
loser."27
In the atmosphere created by such reporting and commen-
tary, against the background of fully justifiable public appre-
hension about nuclear dangers, predictions of a 'Judicial
climate" hostile to the first amendment are almost certain to
become self-fulfilling prophecies.28 Any case that pits the first
amendment against official assertions of national security is
likely to turn out "a real First Amendment loser."
III. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION AND ITS CHILLING
EFFECT
In attempting to impose censorship on grounds of national
security, the government is able to wield sweeping powers of
selective prosecution which can exert a severe chilling effect.
An example that has become all too familiar in recent years is
the Central Intelligence Agency's punitive litigation against dis-
sident former employees who have attempted to publish books
about the Agency.2 9 No such action has been taken, of course,
against former high government officials who have drawn freely
on classified materials for their published works.
Where nuclear "secrets" or other scientific or technical
23. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D. Wis.), dis-
missed mem. 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (comment from the bench).
24. See generally Bagdikian, A Most Insidious Case, QUmL, June 1979, at
21-26.
25. Lansing State J., March 9, 1979, at 1.
26. S.F. Chronicle, March 20, 1979, at 38, col. 1.
27. Wash. Post, March 11, 1979, § C, at 6, col 1.
28. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. In ruling on the preliminary
injunction, Judge Warren made a point of noting that "even the press" wasn't
supporting a continuation of The Progressive case. United States v. Progres-
sive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (WD. Wis.), dismissed mem. 610 F.2d 819 (7th
Cir. 1979).
29. See Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
matter is concerned, the potential for abuse is even greater; the
"restricted" knowledge is widespread within the scientific com-
munity, and even outside of it. Dr. Edward Teller, often de-
scribed as "the father of the H-Bomb," has said of his offspring,
"in science there are very few real secrets. I assume the
French and the British probably know many of our secrets.
The Russians, I venture to guess, know most of our secrets in-
cluding quite a few that we haven't even discovered as yet."30
When some are allowed to disseminate the secret, while others
may be subjected to prior restraint or prosecution, the potential
for intimidation is enormous.
In the course of the Progressive case, our attorneys submit-
ted to the courts more than two dozen publications or broad-
cast transcripts that contained some or all of the allegedly
"secret" material that we had been enjoined from publishing.31
A Milwaukee Sentinel reporter, after a week of research in the
public libraries of Milwaukee, Wisconsin and Waukegan, lE-
nois, came up with the "secret" of the H-Bomb and published it
in his newspaper.32 Dr. Teller himself gave the "secret" away
years ago in an article for the Encyclopedia Americana.33 Yet
The Progressive alone was singled out for prior restraint.
When the government invokes national security to protect
technical or scientific "secrets" from dissemination, its claims
should be viewed with extreme skepticism; there are few
secrets in science that last for more than a few months. The
notion of "atomic secrecy," however, is so deeply imbedded in
the public consciousness that the government's national secur-
ity claims are likely to be believed. Even if the government's
secrecy rationale eventually can be refuted as it was in the Pro-
gressive case, the costs can be so formidable that they consti-
tute a chilling effect against publication. Before the
Government dropped its case, The Progressive had incurred al-
most $250,000 in legal costs-a huge sum for a small, financially
unstable political journal. The Progressive is still a long way
from paying off its indebtedness. The pressures on The Pro-
gressive's small staff and budget came close to forcing it out of
30. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973, opinion page.
31. See, e.g., Taylor, Nuclear Safeguards, ANxUAL REVIEW OF NucLEAIn ScI-
ENCE 407 (1975). One of these publications was a Soviet journal that we ob-
tained from a Swedish library. See Prokhorov, SovIE PHYsIcs USPEKHI, 547
(1976).
32. Milwaukee Sentinel, April 30, 1979, at 1, coL 1.
33. E. Teller, Hydrogen Bomb, 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA A IEICANA 654-56 (1979).
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business and might easily dissuade another publication from
pursuing its first amendment rights.
IV. PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
When prior restraint is sought to protect national security,
the judicial process itself becomes a mockery. For the sake of
consistency, if for no other reason, the government must insist
on maintaining the same sort of secrecy in court that it is try-
ing to enforce in print. The results can be both ludicrous and
ominous. For example, under a protective order sought by the
Government and granted by the court,34 the Government was
able to precensor all court filings, determining which docu-
ments would be submitted only in camera and which would be
part of the public record of the case.
Additionally, in order to participate in our defense, all of
our attorneys had to submit to security clearance by the Gov-
ernment.35 The actual defendants in the case chose not to sub-
mit to this clearance, because we objected to the process in
principle and did not want to be burdened with any more
"secrets" that we could not publish. We were thus unable to
participate effectively in our own defense, and were denied ac-
cess to substantial portions of the court record, including "clas-
sified" sections of briefs filed in our behalf. Similarly, exhibits
and affidavits filed by our attorneys were ordered by the Gov-
ernment to be held in camera, and the contents of these mater-
ials, and, in some cases, their very existence, were not made
known to us until long after the Government had abandoned its
attempt at prior restraint. When we asked Judge Warren to va-
cate his preliminary injunction against publication, he rejected
our motion in a secret opinion3 6 which we, the defendants
bound by it, were unable to see for many months.37 Our expert
witnesses, too, had to submit to security clearances so that
they could familiarize themselves with court documents, or at
least with the contested article. In some instances, potential
witnesses refused, on principle, to submit to clearance. In
other instances, the clearance process took so long that we
34. United States v. Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. March 14,
1979) (protective order).
35. See generally Mooney, supra note 19, at 35.
36. United States v. Progressive, Inc., No. 79-C-98 (W.D. Wis. June 15, 1979)
(secret order).
37. Even today, some portions of the court record remain sealed-not be-
cause they contain "secrets," but because the government regards them as
"sensitive."
19811
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were, in fact, denied permission to avail ourselves of these ex-
perts' testimony or assistance.
When the court went into closed session, the defendants,
as well as the public and the press, were excluded. The defend-
ants' attorneys were cautioned not to discuss, even with their
clients, what had transpired in camera, a stricture which they
scrupulously observed. Fortunately, the Court of Appeals deci-
sively rejected a Government motion that our appeal be argued
in camera.
Since we were enjoined not only from publishing the spe-
cific article, but also from "otherwise communicating or disclos-
ing" its contents "in any manner," we found ourselves severely
inhibited in what we could say about the Government's assault
on our first amendment rights. The most frustrating example
was the aforementioned Milwaukee Sentinel article based on
research in the Milwaukee and Waukegan public libraries.38
When our attorneys submitted it to the court, the Government
ordered it held in camera. That meant we could not discuss it,
under the terms of the court's protective order, without risking
a contempt citation and possible prosecution under the Atomic
Energy Act.
All of these severe distortions of the judicial process help
to illustrate why prior restraint has always been held in partic-
ular contempt by those who value freedom. Prior restraint is,
perhaps, the most obnoxious form of governmental abuse be-
cause it puts the government's own conduct beyond public
scrutiny. In the absence of censorship, any other offense
against liberty is, at least, visible to the people; prior restraint
provides its own blanket of concealment. The government
needs to offer no public justification for imposing secrecy; the
justification itself is secret.
V. INFRINGEMENT OF OTHER FREEDOMS
Once a prior restraint is imposed for reasons of national se-
curity, the infringement of other freedoms is a logical and ines-
capable consequence. In this respect, censorship on grounds of
national security carries implications that are unique and ex-
tremely disturbing, especially for those who are being cen-
sored. It was only gradually, during the half-year we were
under court-ordered restraint, that we became fully aware of
those implications.
38. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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The United States Government alleged, and the court
agreed, that we possessed a "secret" which, if disclosed, might
create catastrophic consequences for the United States and, in-
deed, for the entire world. The Government implied that some
foreign powers or other interests would be eager to possess
that "secret." The "secret" could be conveyed in a few
sentences consisting entirely of nontechnical words.
If the Government really believed all that, it had an obliga-
tion to take every conceivable step to protect the "secret" and
prevent is disclosure. At The Progressive and its printing con-
tractors, there were perhaps a dozen persons--editors, typists,
typesetters, and proofreaders-who had read Howard Mor-
land's article, 'The H-Bomb Secret,"39 and were, therefore, in a
position to divulge the "secret." There were also other people
to whom we or the author had shown the manuscript at various
points in its preparation in order to obtain guidance or verifica-
tion. They, too, were in a position to divulge the "secret."
If the Government was serious about the consequences of
disclosure, surely its responsibility did not end with the imposi-
tion of a court-ordered prior restraint on publication. What was
to prevent any one of us from whispering the "secret" to a for-
eign agent over a beer in a neighborhood saloon, from sealing it
in a letter and dropping it in a mailbox, or from blurting it out
over the telephone? Should we not assume, then, that forever-
more--or for as long as our "secret" was, in the Government's
view, a secret-we would be followed, kept under surveillance,
have our mail read, our telephone tapped, or our every conver-
sation monitored? We never dwelled on such possibilities be-
cause we never believed for a moment that the Government
actually was convinced of its own "secrecy" claims. The logic,
however, was there, and will apply if the Government again at-
tempts to impose prior restraint on grounds of national secur-
ity. Censorship raises the possibility of far more sinister
assaults on liberty than the imposition of a prior restraint.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have said nothing here about the impact of censorship on
public policymaking in a supposedly democratic society. This
is not an oversight. 'The people's right to know" is a critically
important doctrine, but one that is separate from first amend-
39. The Progressive did eventually publish the article. See Morland, The H-
Bomb Secret-How We Got 1t Why We're Telling It, THE PROGRESSIVE, Novem-
ber 1979, at 14.
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ment concerns. The first amendment deals with the people's
right to speak, to publish, and to disseminate. "The people's
right to know" justifies serious, important, responsible speech
and writing. The virtue of the first amendment is that it pro-
tects utterances which the state and the courts, as well as the
respectable pillars of society, may regard as wholly irresponsi-
ble.
It would be particularly inappropriate, I believe, to inject
"the people's right to know" into a discussion devoted to a cele-
bration of Near v. Minnesota. There was nothing edifying
about Jay M. Near or the scurrilous sheet he published-noth-
ing that contributed to the people's right to know. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota correctly described it as "devoted
largely to malicious, scandalous, and defamatory matter."40 It
was the admirable, remarkable achievement of the Supreme
Court majority that it unequivocably upheld the first amend-
ment in the case of a shabby character like Near and a sorry
rag like his Saturday Press.
Well, the holding was almost without equivocation. There
was that "extremely narrow exception" for time of war-the ex-
ception "no one would question." I came to question it inten-
sively during that half a year when my mind was wonderfully
concentrated on the first amendment. I came to believe that
when it comes to matters of fundamental freedom, and the first
amendment is our most fundamental freedom, even the nar-
rowest of exceptions is too broad. And when that narrow ex-
ception is based on claims of national security, the likelihood of
abuse is so great that it becomes unavoidable.
There is a reason, I suspect, why the first amendment was
written without exceptions of any kind, even those "no one
would question." There is a reason for it to have been written
so simply, so clearly, and so absolutely.
40. State exr teL Olson v. Guilford, 179 Minn. 40, 41, 228 N.W. 326, 328 (1929),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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